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ABSTRACT
Does democracy encourage free trade? It depends. Broadening the franchise involves transferring
power from non-elected elites to the wider population, most of whom will  be workers. The
Hecksher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson logic says that democratization should lead to more liberal trade
policies in countries where workers stand to gain from free trade; and to more protectionist policies
in countries where workers will benefit from the imposition of tariffs and quotas. We test and
confirm these political economy implications of trade theory hypothesis using data on democracy,















Does democracy encourage free trade, or do democratic reforms make it more
difficult to achieve the market liberalizations that are necessary for economic growth?
While democracy is obviously a non-negotiable moral imperative, this fundamental
question is nonetheless one which has been posed periodically by policy makers, and
continues to be posed today. There are two positions on the issue, as might be
expected. On the one hand, there are those who feel that political and economic
openness, or democracy and markets, are inherently complementary. This sunny
optimism  has  been  expressed,  among  others,  by  former  US  President  William
Jefferson Clinton, according to whom “Democracies don’t attack each other. They
make better trading partners, and partners in diplomacy.”
1 On the other hand, there is
a darker and more pessimistic tradition which holds that democracy can undermine
the political will to keep markets open; or alternatively, that it is only by stifling
opposition that governments can impose free trade on an unwilling population.
There are certainly many individual case studies which can be appealed to by
advocates of both positions. Most notable, perhaps, has been the embrace in the 1990s
of both democracy and free trade by the countries of Eastern Europe, which had been
denied both for so long. Other examples suggesting a complementary relationship
between the two include mid-nineteenth century Britain, which extended the franchise
in 1832 and abolished the Corn Laws soon after; or the descent into dictatorship and
autarky of much of Africa following independence in the 1950s and 1960s. But
counter-arguments are easy to come by as well. If those same African countries, as
well as their counterparts in much of Asia, had been relatively open to trade prior to
World War II (or World War I in the case of countries such as China and Japan), this
was largely because they had been forced to open up by foreign military pressure,
sometimes expressing itself as formal empire, but always denying local people the
right to self-determination in this policy domain. Famously, it was the autocratic
Napoleon III who pushed the Cobden-Chevalier trade treaty through an unwilling
French political system in 1860, while it took a bloody coup and a right-wing
dictatorship to institute free market reforms in 1970s Chile. Most recently, a series of
                                                   
1 Cited in Bliss and Russett (1998, 1126).2
popular referenda in Europe seem to have undermined the drive towards ever-deeper
integration in Europe, to the horror of Europe’s political class, although whether this
should be taken as a rejection of market liberalization or of bureaucratic dirigisme is a
priori hard to say.
In the academic sphere there is no shortage of relevant literature, although
systematic quantitative papers of the sort required to sift through the often-conflicting
empirical evidence remain scarce. Karl Polanyi is one obvious reference point: for
him, “Socialism is, essentially, the tendency inherent in an industrial civilization to
transcend the self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it to a democratic
society” (Polanyi 1957, 234). And yet the growing social regulation which democracy
can give rise to is not necessarily incompatible with open markets: indeed, the
opposite seems to have been the case in nineteenth century Europe, where newly-
enfranchised workers in countries such as Belgium supported free trade in exchange
for a variety of labor market regulations and social insurance programs (Huberman
forthcoming; Huberman and Lewchuk 2003). More generally, there is a theoretical
tension between two opposing forces, as Geoffrey Garrett points out:
On the one hand, democracy makes leaders more accountable to their citizens,
promoting trade liberalization to the extent that this is good for society as a
whole. On the other hand, democracy also empowers distributional coalitions
with intense interests, making higher levels of protectionism more likely...
(Garrett 2000, 973)
2
                                                   
2 Such considerations obviously relate strongly to two closely related, broader debates which
are too vast to be adequately summarised here. The first concerns the relationship between
democracy and economic growth: see, e.g., Olson (1993) or Przeworski and Limongi (1993)
for some of the theoretical arguments. Recent empirical papers include Rigobon and Rodrik
(2005), who find a positive relationship between democracy and economic performance, and
Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) who argue that democratic transitions tend to have a positive
effect on economic growth, even in the short run. On the other hand, Barro (1996) finds that
once variables such as the rule of law, free markets and government size have been controlled
for, the effect of democracy on growth is weakly negative. There is also a large empirical
literature on whether democracy promotes economic liberalization: for a flavor of this debate,
see de Haan and Sturm (2003), and papers cited therein. This literature typically (but not
always) finds that democracy promotes economic freedom; more interestingly, perhaps, a
recent paper (Persson 2005) argues that the form of democracy matters for the adoption or
otherwise  of  growth-promoting  policies.  In  our  view,  however,  different  types  of
liberalization have different distributional effects, and are thus likely to be affected differently
by extending the franchise: it makes sense to look at individual policies separately.3
Empirical work testing for an impact of democracy on the adoption of free
trade policies has largely used the “gravity” framework to explore whether pairs of
democratic countries trade more than would be expected if one or both were non-
democratic (Bliss and Russett 1998; Morrow, Siverson and Taberes 1998; Mansfield,
Milner and Rosendorff 2000). Such papers explore the determinants of the level of
trade between country pairs; the real question however is whether democracies have
more open trading policies than other countries, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, as the
Garrett quotation above suggests, the impact of democratization on trade policies may
not be the same in all countries: a one-size-fits-all regression coefficient in an
equation explaining trade policies as a function of democracy, as well as other control
variables, is almost by definition going to give the wrong result. We need to do better
than that.
There is another, well-developed literature on the political economy of trade
policy, whose central purpose is to ask what determines countries’ trade policies. The
answer is that it all depends: on a country’s relative endowments, which determine its
comparative advantage vis-à-vis the rest of the world; and on the relative strength of
the winning and losing sectors (e.g., Gourevitch 1986) or factors of production (e.g.,
Rogowski 1989). These studies typically do not focus on the question posed by this
paper, namely what affect does democratization have on trade policy. Indeed, such
models, as well as more formal ones of the type associated with Mayer (1984),
Findlay and Wellisz (1984) or Grossman and Helpman (2001), tend to take political
institutions as given in their analysis. The argument in this paper, however, is that it is
only by looking at our question through the lens of this political economy literature
that a satisfactory answer to the question can be formulated.
Our hypothesis is simple. Broadening the franchise involves transferring
power from non-elected elites to the wider population, most of whom will be workers.
Democratization will lead to more liberal trade policies in countries where workers
stand to gain from free trade; and to more protectionist policies in countries where
workers will benefit from the imposition of tariffs and quotas. According to standard
Heckscher-Ohlin theory, therefore, democratization will boost support for free trade
in labor-abundant countries, and lower it in labor-scarce economies. While debate still
rages about the adequacy of such theory when it comes to explaining international
distributional trends today, we know that Heckscher-Ohlin theory does a good job in
explaining distributional trends during the late nineteenth century, which was the4
epoch which motivated these two Swedish economists in the first place (O’Rourke
and Williamson 1994, 1999; O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson 1996; Williamson
1996, 2002). If our hypothesis is valid, then the late nineteenth century should be a
good place to test it; and in subsequent sections of the paper we do precisely this,
using the cross-country dataset pieced together by Jeffrey Williamson and his co-
authors (Blattman, Clemens and Williamson 2002; Clemens and Williamson 2004;
Williamson 2003).
There are two existing papers which are particularly close in spirit to this one.
The first one is Dutt and Mitra (2002), which looks at the impact of inequality on
trade barriers in capital-abundant and capital-scarce economies. The paper assumes
that societies are democratic, that voters are endowed with labor and capital, and that
the median voter determines trade policy outcomes. In more unequal societies, the
median voter will own less capital, and thus policies will be more tilted towards labor:
that is to say, they will be more pro-free-trade in labor-abundant (capital-scarce)
societies  than  in  labor-scarce  (capital-abundant)  societies.  Dutt  and  Mitra  find
empirical support for this proposition, using cross-national, late twentieth century
data.
Our paper can be seen as providing another test of median voter theory that is
complementary to theirs and arguably more appropriate, at least in a nineteenth
century context. In time series for societies undergoing transformations towards or
away from democracy, it is not the endowments of the median voter that are changing
so much; rather, it is the identity of the median voter that is changing, as sections of
the population are being enfranchised or disenfranchised. Like Dutt and Mitra, we
assume that such shifts will have different impacts on different countries, depending
on their factor endowments. Unlike them, however, we broaden the scope away from
labor and capital, since in order to understand the political economy of late nineteenth
century trade policy we have to consider the interests of land as well.
3
We have to date been able to find two papers whose arguments anticipate the
one made here. The first paper is Sachs and Warner (1995, 32), who titillate their
readers  by  promising  (in  a  later  paper)  a  “detailed  model  of  the  timing  of
liberalization during the postwar period”. In the preliminary regression included in the
1995 paper, they show that liberalization was earlier in countries with high labor-to-
                                                   
3 As the papers and book cited above make abundantly clear.5
land ratios, which they had predicted on the basis that workers in these countries
would gain from free trade; earlier, however (Sachs and Warner 1995, 20–21), they
speculate that this mechanism would depend on the nature of political institutions in
place in each country. This paper tests that proposition explicitly. The second paper is
Milner and Kubota (2005), which we became aware of since beginning the project.
Their strategy is to run straightforward regressions of late twentieth century trade
policy on democracy, but to limit their sample of countries to developing countries,
which are by assumption labor-abundant. The HO prediction is then that more
democratic countries will be more open, and this prediction is confirmed by the data.
Obviously, this finding is consistent with our argument; however, it does not exclude
the possibility that more democratic countries are more open in the developed world
as  well,  which  would  obviously  be  completely  at  odds  with  the  median  voter
mechanism proposed here.
In this paper, we do not pre-assign countries to any particular category (e.g.
labor-abundant or labor-scarce); rather, we let the data do this for us. This allows us to
test our hypothesis for both rich and poor countries. It also lets us be more confident
that what we are testing is indeed our preferred HO median voter theory linking
democracy to policy, rather than some entirely different theory yielding a “one-size-
fits-all” relationship applying to all countries. Moreover, we will explore the impact
of both capital-labor and land-labor ratios on the democracy-policy link. According to
Rogowski (1989), although both ratios could matter in principle, in practice it was the
land-labor ratio that determined whether workers were in favor of free trade or
protection. That is, in countries where land-labor ratios were high, workers should
have been protectionist, and democracy should have been associated with higher
tariffs, no matter what the capital-labor ratio; while the opposite should have been true
in countries where land-labor ratios were low. It turns out that these predictions can
be tested using the data at our disposal.
2. Democracy, the median voter and protection in a three-factor world
The literature we have reviewed conveys some mixed messages concerning the
impact of increased democracy on the degree of protectionism. Can economic theory
provide any clarification? In this section of the paper we review perhaps the most
relevant benchmark model of the political economy of trade policy.6
A Simple Median Voter Model
We start with the simple textbook 2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin framework, where the two
factors are labor and land. To introduce political economy we employ the familiar
median voter model. Individuals each own one unit of labor but they differ in their
endowments of land. This inequality in endowments leads not only to inequality in
incomes, but also to different preferences on trade policy among individuals (Mayer
1984; Dutt and Mitra 2002; Feenstra 2004, chapter 9).
We now adopt an assumption about the extension of the franchise that is
broadly consistent with historical experience. The population is assumed to consist of
a large set of individuals 
€ 
i =1,…,L, where the individuals are ordered according to
decreasing levels of land endowment 
i R , so that
€ 
R
i is decreasing in i. Policy is
decided by a majority of the popular vote among a subset of enfranchised individuals
€ 
i =1,…,2M. Here, D = 2M/L < 1 serves as an index of democracy (or the extent of
the franchise) in the society, and we are restricting attention to cases where the
franchise is the exclusive preserve of the richest fraction D of the landowners. In this
setting, the median voter is individual M, and this voter owns
M R units of land.
Since  voters  differ  on  only  one  dimension—their  land  ownership—  the
median voter theorem can be applied, and the lessons of the venerable Stolper-
Samuelson theorem supply all the necessary intuition. So we must ask, when it comes
to trade policy, what does individual M want? Individuals poorly endowed with land
would vote in line with the preferences of a pure owner of labor—they will favor
higher tariffs when labor is a scarce factor in the country relative to the rest of the
world. Individuals richly endowed with land would tend to vote more in line with the
preferences of a pure owner of land —they will favor higher tariffs when land is a
scarce factor in the country relative to the rest of the world.
As the franchise is extended, M increases, and the median voter looks less like
a landowner and more like a laborer. The implications are clear, when the median
voter’s preferences determine trade policy in this setting: in a land-abundant country,
democracy increases protectionism; in a land-scarce country, democracy reduces
protectionism.
Formally, the result is derived as follows (adapted from Feenstra 2004, chapter
9). Suppose each individual i has a quasi-linear utility function given by  ) ( 0




i is consumption of a numéraire export good, and 
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i is the consumption of7
the import good. Consumers all have the same optimal consumption 
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i = d(p), with
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Both the export and import goods are produced using labor and land. The total
endowments of labor and land are L and R, respectively. The fixed world price of the
import is denoted by 
€ 
p




* + t.  Let 
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y(p) denote the supply of the import-competing good, with
0 ) ( > ′ p y .  Imports  are  then 
€ 
m(p) = d(p)L − y(p).  Tariff  revenue  is  equal  to
€ 
T = tm(p), which we assume is redistributed via a poll subsidy. Let the wage be w
and the rental price of land be q, so that individual income is 
€ 
I
i = w + qR
















i /(R/L) is the land/labor ratio for individual i relative to the overall
land/labor  ratio  in  the  economy.  Total  GDP  in  the  economy  is
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where the first line uses Roy’s Identity, the second line employs (3), the third line
invokes the MRT-equals-price condition 
€ 
′  y  0 (p) + p ′  y (p) = 0, and the fourth line
exploits  the  fact  that  tariff  revenue  can  be  written 
€ 
T = t d(p)L − y(p) [ ]= tm(p),
implying 
€ 
dT/dt = m(p) + t ′  m (p).8
If the tariff is determined by majority vote, then the tariff prevailing will be
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2 < 0). Setting (4) equal to zero, the median voter’s preferred tariff (or
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We next examine the signs of the terms on the right hand side of this expression.
o  Clearly, 
€ 
′  m (p) < 0, since imports fall as the price of the importable
rises.




M /(R/L) is the land/labor ratio for the median voter
relative to the overall land/labor endowment of the economy. When
democracy is limited, M is small, and 
€ 
θ
Mwill be well above one,
reflecting  the  privileged  position  of  the  voting  class  as  large
landowners. When the franchise is fully extended, M is large, and
€ 
θ
Mwill be below one, reflecting the fact that the median individual in
society owns less than the average amount of land in an unequal
society (Alesina and Rodrik 1994).
o  Finally, when the import good is labor-intensive (the country is land
abundant), the Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that dq/dp < 0;
when the import good is land-intensive (the country is land scarce),
dq/dp > 0.
To sum up these results for empirical purposes, we expect, all else equal,:
o  In land scarce countries, tariffs will be high when democracy is limited, but
low when democracy is broad.
o  In land abundant countries, tariffs will be low when democracy is limited, but
high when democracy is broad.
Extending The Model to Three Factors
Of course, the real world is more complicated than such a simple 2x2 model, and thus
the political economy of trade policy will be more complicated as well. In our
empirical analysis, we will explicitly take account of the fact that there are more than
two factors of production. Indeed, we will follow the classical economists of the9
period, as well as a great many economic historians, and consider a world in which
there are three factors of production: land, labor, and capital. Of course, we could
have replaced “land” with “capital” in the preceding analysis and obtained precisely
the same predictions; in capital-scarce countries, extending the franchise should favor
free trade, while the opposite should be the case in capital-abundant countries (as in
Dutt and Mitra 2002).
It would also be a trivial extension of the model if land and capital were
everywhere available in the same, fixed proportions, for they could then be analyzed
as a single composite factor of production, with precisely the same results obtaining.
More generally, one might presume that in economies where both capital-labor and
land-labor ratios were high, extending the franchise would lead to greater protection;
but that in economies where both capital and land were scarce relative to labor,
democratization should lead to more liberal trade policies.
The problem is, however, that capital-land ratios vary greatly across countries.
There are thus countries with high capital-labor ratios, but low land-labor ratios; and
countries with low capital-labor ratios and high land-labor ratios. What will be the
effect of extending the franchise in such “mixed” cases? In a series of papers,
Thompson (1985, 1986) has shown that in a three-factor two-good model, raising
tariffs can either raise or lower the returns to any factor of production. Indeed, moving
to free trade might even have “perverse” effects on factor prices—for example,
lowering land rents in countries were they were initially below the world average. In
such  a  setting,  therefore,  we  are  unlikely  to  obtain  unambiguous  theoretical
predictions. Indeed, there is an even more fundamental theoretical problem, since
median voter models are difficult to set up in such a three-factor setting (Mayer
1984).
In his classic book, Ronald Rogowski (1989, 6) simplifies, by assuming that
“the land-labor ratio informs us fully about any country’s endowment of those two
factors.” That is, in his basic schema he assumes that where land-labor ratios are high,
labor is a relatively scarce factor and will thus favor protection, regardless of capital-
labor ratios; and that where land-labor ratios are low, labor is relatively abundant, and
will thus favor free trade, regardless of capital-labor ratios. (He later relaxes this
assumption, and looks at the consequences of assuming that both land and labor are
abundant/scarce relative to capital. In this case land and labor will hold similar
positions on trade, the result being so-called “red-green” coalitions; the operative10
assumption throughout the book is, however, that such cases are relatively rare.) This
seems to us to be a testable hypothesis, in that the prediction is that democratization
will spur liberalization in all economies with high labor-land ratios, regardless of
capital-labor ratios; and that it will spur protection in all economies with low labor-
land-ratios,  again  regardless  of  capital-labor  ratios.  In  the  context  of  the  late
nineteenth century, Rogowski’s basic assumption implies that democracy should have
been associated with higher tariffs everywhere in the land-abundant New World, both
in the more advanced societies of North America and Oceania, as well as in the less
industrialized countries of Latin America; while it should have been associated with
lower tariffs everywhere in land-scarce Europe, as much in capital-abundant core
countries such as the United Kingdom and Belgium, as in capital-scarce countries on
the southern and eastern peripheries.
3. Data and econometric results
Starting with the assumption that land-labor ratios provide a sufficient statistic for
determining the preferences of the median voter, we set out to test our simple model
using annual country-level panel data for the period 1870–1914. The sample of
countries includes not just countries in Europe and North America, but a total of 35
countries both developed and developing: Argentina, Australia, Austria-Hungary,
Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt,
France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand,
Norway,  Peru,  Philippines,  Portugal,  Russia,  Serbia,  Spain,  Sweden,  Thailand,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. As already mentioned,
the dataset was constructed by Jeffrey Williamson and his co-authors in a series of
papers exploring the causes and consequences of protectionism in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries (Blattman, Clemens and Williamson 2002; Clemens and
Williamson 2004; Williamson 2003).
To test the basic median voter model, with just two factors of production, land
and labor, the econometric specification we adopt is as follows:
€ 
tariffit = β1democit + β2[democit × ln(Rit /Lit)]+ ui + εit. (6)11
The variables are defined as follows. The dependent variable 
€ 
tariffit is the measure of
protection, and as a proxy for this variable we use the ratio of duties to imports
expressed in percent.
The measure of the breadth of the franchise is 
€ 
democit, which ranges over a 0-
1 scale and is based on the index of democracy taken from the Polity database.
However, we reason that the democratic forces captured in the median voter model
can only generate changes in tariff policy if countries are free to set their own tariff
policy. Many countries of the time were not allowed to pursue independent tariff
policies, even if they were not formal colonies. Some, like India or Indonesia, were
run  by  European  colonial powers,  who  imposed  liberal trade  policies on  their
possessions; others, like China or Turkey, while independent, were nevertheless
obliged to run virtually free-trade policies as a result of treaties with western powers
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Here, the polity score is the measure of democracy on a 0-10 scale, and tariff
autonomy is one except for countries that have no policy freedom to set their own
tariffs. In our sample the no-autonomy observations are: Burma, Ceylon, China,
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan (before 1899), Thailand, and Turkey.
4
The endowment measure is the log land-labor ratio 
€ 
ln(Rit /Lit), based on the
estimated area of arable (food) crops in hectares divided by labor force. These data
are  taken  from  Clemens  and  Williamson  (2004)  and  Blattman,  Clemens  and
Williamson (2002).
The scaling of the right hand side variables in equation (6) is of no great
consequence. For convenience, we rescale 
€ 
democit to take a value between 0 (low)
and 1 (high) and we standardize the 
€ 
ln(Rit /Lit) variable to have a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one. Thus, 
€ 
ln(Rit /Lit) is negative for countries with below-
average land-labor ratios and it is important to bear this in mind when interpreting
                                                   
4 Based on a reading of Bairoch (1989), the standard English-language source on nineteenth
century trade policies.12
some of the results which follow. Summary statistics for the key variables of interest
are shown in the Appendix Table.
The regression equation (6) also includes a fixed effect 
€ 
ui and allows for a
serially correlated error term 
€ 
εit, with autocorrelation coefficient 
€ 
ρ common to all
countries. Inclusion of fixed effects controls for each country’s “average” pattern of
endowments and democracy over the length of the sample period, as well as for any
other country-specific factors leading to systematically higher or lower tariffs over
time. The marginal effect of an increase in the extent of democracy is then captured
by  the  slope  coefficients.  The  identification  of  this  effect  is  from  a  “within”
regression—that is, the slope is estimated using the time dimension for each country
in the panel. We are therefore seeking to answer the question: if a given country had
changed its political institutions then, allowing for the country’s factor endowments,
what would have been the likely change in trade policy?
Table 1 shows the results of our estimation. In column 1 we estimate (6)
without the interaction term to test a naive model inspired by those who argue that
democracy is always associated with liberalization, as well as those such as Polanyi
who argue that democracy provided a way for societies to mute the impact of markets.
Neither of these positions finds much support in the data. Democracy was not
associated with protection in this period, either positively or negatively.
In columns (2) through (4) we add the interaction term that allows for the
impact of democracy on tariffs to vary depending on the country’s factor endowment,
as suggested by the two-factor median voter model. The positive coefficient on the
interaction  term  implies  that  democratization  raises  tariffs  in  countries  with
sufficiently  high  land-labor  ratios  (
€ 
ln(Rit /Lit)>  0);  and  it  lowers  tariffs  with
sufficiently low land-labor ratios (
€ 
ln(Rit /Lit)<0). Still, the model finds only weak
support here, with the coefficient on the interaction term statistically insignificant at
conventional levels.
Some readers may have worried that our specification of the democracy
variable, which took into account not just the level of the franchise, but also the
freedom of the country in question to set its own tariffs, may not adequately deal with
the fact that several countries in our sample did not enjoy tariff autonomy during this
period. In order to satisfy them, we have included two additional sets of results in
Table 1. Column (3) excludes colonies from the sample, on the grounds that colonies13
might not have had true freedom to set their own tariff policies; column (4) includes
only those countries in our sample which enjoyed tariff autonomy during our period.
Of these two subsets, we prefer the latter, since countries like Australia and Canada,
while linked to Britain, did enjoy tariff autonomy and used it to raise tariffs; while
other countries, such as Siam or China, which were nominally independent, had no
such  freedom.  These  results  show  that  democracy  is  a  statistically  significant
determinant of protectionism once factor endowments are included in the model, for
this sample of countries. One possible reason for the difference between these results
and those in column (2) is that in the countries without tariff autonomy, not only were
tariff rates fixed at levels specified by the great powers for decades at a stretch, but as
often as not there was no democracy, or any movement towards democracy, during
the  late  nineteenth  century.  With  both  their  tariff  rates  and  democracy  scores
essentially fixed during the period, it may be no surprise that including such countries
in  the  analysis  reduces  the  variation  in  the  data  and  weakens  the  statistical
significance of our results.
Was democracy a quantitatively significant determinant of trade policy in
countries enjoying tariff autonomy during the period? One simple way to gauge this is
to look at the counterfactual changes in the implied tariff level predicted by the model
as we change the level of democracy, whilst holding fixed factor endowments. Recall
that our measure of the land-labor ratio was standardized, so a simple way to proceed
is to use the model to forecast tariffs at all levels of democracy between zero and one,
for the average country, when the land-labor ratio is set to –2, –1, 0, 1, or 2
(corresponding to difference, in standard deviations, of the country’s raw log land-
labor ratio from the world average). These results are shown in Figure 1, based on our
preferred specification in Table 1, Column 4.
The model predicts that for a country with an average land-labor ratio, the
change in tariffs would be minimal after a “full democratization” experiment, that is,
an increase in democracy from the minimum of zero to the maximum of 10. For a
country with a land-labor ratio roughly one standard deviation below the mean (such
as the U.K., with a standardized log land-labor ratio of –0.93 in 1870), tariffs would
be predicted to fall by about 2.5 percentage points. For a country with a land-labor
ratio one standard deviation above the mean (such as the U.S., with a standardized log
land-labor ratio of +0.83 in 1870), tariffs would be predicted to rise by about 2.5
percentage points in the same experiment. For countries with even more extreme14
endowment vectors, the effects would be larger still. For example, in Argentina (with
a standardized log land-labor ratio of +2.15 in 1870), the “full democratization”
experiment would be predicted to raise tariffs by about 5 percentage points.
These results offer some insights into the evolution of national tariff policies
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In land-abundant countries, the
extension of the franchise raised popular pressure for protection, but in land-scarce
countries  the  same  democratic  tendencies  encouraged  trade  liberalization.  The
mechanism identified by the model is the different endowment bundles owned by
median voters in the two groups of countries. Whilst we should never take the median
voter model too literally, given its simplistic assumptions and dubious implications
about  voting  behavior,  we  think  it  nonetheless  proves  revealing  as  a  way  of
illustrating the power of the “middle-of-the-road” electoral group to drive commercial
policy.
Robustness Check: Three-Factor Model
In Table 2, we extend our tests to a three-factor setting, and interact the democracy
variable with capital-labor as well as with land-labor ratios. Building on equation (6),
the estimating equation is now
€ 
tariffit = β1democit + β2[democit × ln(Rit /Lit)]+ β3[democit × ln(Kit /Lit)]+ ui + εit. (8)
Obtaining historical capital-labor ratios for our sample is no simple task. The
capital-labor ratio is physical capital per worker, based on the 1890–1914 average
level for each country taken from Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006). These capital
stock estimates are based on standardized perpetual inventory methods (and guessed
starting  values).  We  consider  only  the  average  in  the  later  part  of  our  period
1890–1914 simply because perpetual inventory data are likely subject to wide initial
estimation errors close to the start date of these series, which is no earlier than 1870 in
most cases. It should be noted that these capital stock measures are only available for
occasional benchmark dates. Since we average them, they contain no time series
variation within each country. Furthermore, there are no capital stock data for the
following countries: Ceylon, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Philippines,
Russia, Serbia, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay. For consistency in the presentation of the15
results, these countries are omitted from the sample for all regressions reported in
Table 2.
For reference, column (1) replicates the specification used in Table 1 for the
new  sample.  The  basic  point  of  the  simple  land-labor  median-voter  model  is
underscored again, and the coefficient on the interaction term even rises to the 5%
significance level in this sample. The remaining columns in Table 2 can be viewed as
a test of a more complex, three factor model. As can be seen from Table 2, the capital-
labor interaction terms are statistically significant, and negative. Moreover, this result
is robust to the omission of colonies and countries without tariff autonomy during the
period, as columns (3) and (4) show.
5
Tables 3 and 4 provide additional sensitivity analysis, to gauge the robustness
of our results. They concentrate throughout on the sub-sample of countries enjoying
tariff autonomy, to make them consistent with out preferred specifications in column
(4) of Tables 1 and, especially, 2. Table 3 shows that the results are unaffected if
random effects are used rather than fixed effects, and that they are also unaffected if
time dummies are included alongside country dummies. This is particularly true for
the three-factor specification reported in columns (4) through (6): the coefficients of
interest are very similar in size to those reported in column (4) of Table 2, and are all
highly statistically significant. In the case of the two-factor model, the results also
seem fairly robust, although the interaction term between democracy and the land-
labor ratio becomes statistically insignificant at conventional levels when a random
effects specification without time dummies is used. This does not concern us too
much, however, since the three-factor model clearly fits the data better than the
simpler two-factor model.
Table 4 addresses another concern which some readers may have, namely that
we have not controlled for other factors which might influence tariff levels. Since the
regressions reported in Tables 1 and 2 includes country fixed effects, we are picking
up a lot of these factors already, but Table 4 provides some extra reassurance by
including two variables in the specification which have been found to be important in
                                                   
5 In results not reported we also found the result holds when missing data on democracy (e.g.,
for colonies excluded from Polity) are imputed by backfilling from the first available year. As
an additional check, we also replaced our data on capital-labor ratios with data on output per
capita, to see if the results were an artifact of our capital stock data. (The rationale for using
output per capita is that one would expect rich countries to have high capital-labor ratios,
other things being equal.) The results were robust to this change as well.16
determining average tariff rates (see Blattman, Clemens and Williamson 2002 and
Williamson 2003, 2004). These are the lagged export to GDP share, and lagged
partner tariffs, and as Table 4 shows including them has virtually no effect on the
coefficients of interest to us here, whether we use fixed or random effects, or include
time dummies or not.
Our results thus appear to be robust. What they imply is that, other things
being equal, democratization had a stronger impact on lowering tariffs in rich, capital-
abundant countries than in poor, capital-scarce countries. Such a finding seems at
odds with the median voter model, since as stressed earlier, we should in principle be
able to replace land with capital in the model outlined in section 2 and derive
precisely the same results. In order to understand this result, we need therefore to step
outside the rather limited confines of that model, and enter the real world of late
nineteenth century politics.
Reality Check: Simulating the Rogowski Model
For the purposes of illustration we now simulate the impact of “full democratization”
on tariff policy as predicted by what we regard as our benchmark three-factor model
for the sample of countries with tariff autonomy (Table 2, Column 4). What the
coefficient sign patterns suggest is as follows. In land-scarce Europe, low land-labor
ratios should have implied that democratization lowered tariffs. In the capital-
abundant north-western core, high capital-labor ratios should have reinforced this
effect; thus, in countries such as Britain or Belgium, democratization should have
unambiguously lowered tariffs.
On the other hand, in poorer European countries such as Italy or Spain, low
capital labor ratios should have worked in the opposite direction, and democratization
should have had a far less dramatic effect on liberalization. The implication is that
democracy should have implied much lower tariffs in the European core, but that the
effect should have been weaker in the European periphery. Figure 2 illustrates the
mechanism for two European countries, Britain and Italy. The preferred model of
Table 2 Column 4 predicts that “full democratization” (moving from 0 to 1 on the
horizontal axis) would, ceteris paribus, lower British tariffs by about 7 percentage
points. In Italy the same democratic shift would have lowered tariffs by only 2
percentage points, a muted effect.17
In the New World, the opposite logic applies. Everywhere in the New World,
high land-labor ratios implied that democratization should have been associated with
higher tariffs. However, in the richer parts of the New World, such as the United
States, high capital-labor ratios should have muted this effect significantly. On the
other hand, in poorer regions such as Latin America low capital-labor ratios should
have reinforced the impact of high-land-labor ratios, and thus democratization should
have raised tariffs by a lot. Figure 2 shows the impact of increasing democracy in two
New World economies, the United States and Argentina. The preferred model
predicts that “full democratization” (moving from 0 to 1 on the horizontal axis)
would, ceteris paribus, have raised Argentine tariffs by 7 percentage points. In the
United States the same democratic shift would have actually lowered tariffs by a
small 3 percentage points.
As mentioned, to understand the findings in Figure 2, we have to move
beyond the simple median voter model. What the coefficients in Table 2 imply, in
very broad terms, is that the sign of d(tariff)/d(democ) corresponds to the qualitative
predictions of the Rogowski model (in general, three-factor form) as summarized in
our Table 5.
What we see is that we get an unambiguous result for the rich European core,
as well as for land-abundant but capital-scarce countries in Latin America and
elsewhere. However, in poor land-scarce economies, and economies abundant in both
capital and land, we do not expect much of an effect one way or another. This may
not make sense in terms of the intuitions provided by the median voter model in
Section 2, but it does make sense in terms of nineteenth century politics (Rogowski
1989).
What regions A and D in Table 5 have in common is that in each case, capital
and labor share the same interests as regards trade policy. In region A, both capital
and labor are pro-free-trade, with only land being protectionist; in region D, both
capital and labor are protectionist, with only land being pro-free-trade. Thus, in both
regions capital and labor formed coalitions against land, and political cleavages
relating to trade took on an urban-rural nature. On the other hand, in regions B and C,
capital and labor were on opposite sides of the trade debate. In region B, capital was
pro-free-trade, along with land, while labor was protectionist; while in region C,
capital and land were both protectionist, with only labor supporting lower tariffs. In18
these cases, cleavages over trade policy took on a class nature, with labor being
opposed to both capitalists and landowners.
What our results suggest is that democracy helped labor get its way on tariff
policy, but only if it was supported by capital. In cases where labor was opposed by
both capital and land, extending the franchise was not sufficient to allow labor to push
trade policies in its preferred direction. Extending the logic of the two-factor model in
section 2 to a three-factor case, it would seem that the opposite should have been the
case: in cases where labor was unambiguously scarce (abundant) relative to the two
other factors of production, shifting the median voter in the direction of a ‘pure
worker’ should have unambiguously produced a more pro-labor tariff. The reason
why this was not the case is that in the real world, politics is a more complicated affair
than the median voter model would suggest. In particular, and especially (if not
exclusively) in countries with proportional representation, coalition-building is an
essential requirement for constituencies trying to push particular policies.
The  argument  is  well  illustrated  by  the  Belgian  case  (see  Huberman
forthcoming). The country’s socialist party, the Parti Ouvrier Belge (POB), was
founded in 1885, and from the beginning supported free trade, as would be predicted
by Heckscher-Ohlin theory. However, it was not until the introduction of universal
male suffrage in 1893 that the POB obtained enough votes to be represented in
Parliament: its share of the vote was 13.2% in 1894, 21% in 1898, 22.5% in 1900,
26% in 1904, and 30.3% in 1914. The POB joined forces with the pro-business
liberals in opposing tariffs, which were favored by the pro-landlord conservatives.
Eventually, the POB and the liberals joined forces in government, with the POB using
their support for free trade to extract welfare reforms from their laissez faire liberal
allies. The net result that there was no return to protection in Belgium during this
period, unlike in France and Germany, where conservative agrarian interests gained
the upper hand in the tariff debate. Crucially, neither the POB nor the liberals had
enough votes to govern on their own: throughout the period, both parties’ share of the
vote was much lower than that of the conservatives (which varied from a high of
51.1% in 1894 to a low of 41.4% in 1898). A POB-liberal coalition was necessary for
free trade to hold; and this in turn required both the extension of the franchise, and
agreement between capital and labor on the trade issue. If the POB had been opposed
by both land and capital on trade policy, it would not have had its way.19
By contrast, in poorer regions of the European continent, labor was abundant
but capital was scarce; thus capital and land joined forces on the trade issue. This was
the case in countries like Spain, where Barcelonan industrialists and large landowners
agreed on a policy of rotation between conservative and liberal governments, both of
whom favored protection. The franchise was gradually extended over the course of
the late nineteenth century, but without a natural coalition partner, labor found its
views on trade ignored, with a gradually mounting level of worker discontent,
occasionally  expressed  through  strikes  and  violent  disturbances,  being  one
consequence of this (Rogowski 1989, 41).
4. Conclusion
To the question “does democracy promote free trade?” we can only answer “it
depends.” Political economy considerations are crucial in answering such a question,
and there is no reason to believe that the political economy of trade policy will be the
same in every country. Indeed, standard trade theory suggests that it will vary greatly
across countries: this paper provides further evidence, if such were needed, of the
power of Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowment theory in understanding late nineteenth
century trade and politics. Democracy had directly opposite effects on tariff levels in
rich Europe and the poor New World, while it had relatively small effects on tariffs in
poor land-scarce regions, and rich land-abundant ones.
Furthermore, it is important to reiterate the point that our results are based on
variation across time, not across countries. Across time, the link between democracy
and protection is complicated; across countries, it explains only a small proportion of
the overall variance in the data. In all the regressions reported here, we found (but did
not report) evidence of large country fixed effects, suggesting that other forces were at
work in determining the variation of tariffs across countries: forces which have
recently been identified in a series of papers by Jeffrey Williamson and his co-authors
(and summarized in Williamson 2003, 2004). These were many and varied, and they
included the need for governments to raise revenue, fears of de-industrialization in the
periphery, increases in partner tariffs, and distributional concerns. For the preferred
model in Table 2, Column 4, these fixed effects ranged from a high of 18% in Brazil,
to  a  low  of  –10%  in  Austria-Hungary.  To  put  it  another  way,  our  preferred
specification in column 4 of Table 2 had an overall 
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the fixed effects) of 0.239, and a within 
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2 of just 0.014. There was a strong
relationship between democracy and factor endowments on the one hand, and tariff
levels on the other; but there are a whole range of country-specific factors that
mattered more for policy.
While this paper’s subject matter is deliberately narrow, we suspect that it has
implications for broader debates. If the impact of democracy on trade liberalization is
complicated, the impact of democracy on economic liberalization more generally, not
to mention its impact on economic growth, is likely to be even more complicated.
Democracy is neither a golden bullet ensuring pro-market policies, as some western
triumphalists would have it, nor does it fatally undermine such policies. Democracy
does help produce policies that ordinary voters want, but what they want will vary
dramatically across countries and over time.21
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Table 1













democ 0.261 0.691 1.337 0.094
(0.20) (0.51) (0.90) (0.06)
democ x ln(R/L) — 1.551 2.292 2.516
(1.32) (1.81)* (1.87)*
Observations 1262 1262 1172 1087
Notes: See text.
Panel regression with fixed effects (not shown) and an AR(1) error term.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.25
Table 2













democ 2.680 2.487 4.753 2.103
(1.46) (1.36) (2.34)** (1.13)
democ x ln(R/L) 3.595 4.201 6.467 5.114
(2.21)** (2.56)** (3.48)*** (2.92)***
democ x ln(K/L) — -4.762 -4.089 -4.034
(2.62)*** (2.24)** (2.13)**
Observations 936 936 894 905
Notes: See text. Sample is restricted to countries with data on capital-labor ratio.
Panel regression with fixed effects (not shown) and an AR(1) error term..
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.26
Table 3









year effects yes no yes
estimation fixed effects random effects random effects
democ 0.586 -0.414 -0.687
(0.39) (0.30) (0.49)
democ x ln(R/L) 2.566 1.670 2.143
(1.85)* (1.44) (1.81)*









year effects yes no yes
estimation fixed effects random effects random effects
democ 2.234 2.618 2.415
(1.16) (1.65)* (1.45)
democ x ln(R/L) 4.257 4.571 4.190
(2.30)** (3.39)*** (3.01)***
democ x ln(K/L) -4.114 -4.044 -4.040
(2.13)** (2.62)*** (2.58)***
Observations 905 926 926
Notes: See text.
Samples as in Tables 1 and 2, column 4 (countries with tariff autonomy).
Panel regression with an AR(1) error term.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%27
Table 4
Robustness: Additional Regressors
















year effects no yes no yes
estimation fixed effects fixed effects random
effects
random
effects democ 1.912 2.099 2.312 2.132
(1.02) (1.09) (1.45) (1.28)
democ x ln(R/L) 5.366 4.446 4.731 4.374
(3.05)*** (2.41)** (3.52)*** (3.16)***
democ x ln(K/L) -4.357 -4.614 -4.385 -4.577
(2.29)** (2.40)** (2.83)*** (2.93)***
Observations 904 904 925 925
Notes: See text.
Samples as in Tables 1 and 2, column 4 (countries with tariff autonomy).
Panel regression with an AR(1) error term.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.28
Table 5
Impact of Increasing Democracy on Tariffs in the Rogowski Model















Source: Based on Rogowski (1989, Chapter 1).29
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Appendix Table
Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
tariff 1290 16.839 11.729 1.778 58.200
democ 1290 0.344 0.350 0.000 1.000
ln(R/L) 1290 0.000 1.000 -1.735 2.205
ln(K/L) 957 0.000 1.000 -1.850 1.708
democ x ln(R/L) 1290 0.030 0.493 -1.125 1.797
democ x ln(K/L) 957 0.156 0.606 -1.218 1.708
colony 1290 0.071 0.256 0.000 1.000
tariffautonomy 1290 0.862 0.345 0.000 1.000